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Case No. 20080576-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Larry Douglas Dunn, Jr., 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for eleven counts of theft by deception, a 
second degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did Defendant's inability to perform his part of the plea bargain before 
sentencing entitle him to withdraw his guilty plea? 
Standard of Review. This Court will "review a trial court's denial of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard, incorporating the 
clearly erroneous standard for the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction 
with that decision." State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, ^ 7, 95 P.3d 1203 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Lehi, 2003 UT App 212,1f 7, 73 P.3d 985). 
2. Defendant's claim that the trial court erred by accepting his guilty plea 
without an adequate factual basis is presented for the first time on appeal, and 
Defendant does not assert or establish plain error. Can he prevail? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue. 
3. Did the sentencing court abuse its discretion by running three of 
Defendant's eleven prison terms consecutively? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's sentencing decision for 
an abuse of discretion. See State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, *{ 14,82 P.3d 1167. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 2004): 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon 
leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401 (West 2004): 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of 
the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with eleven counts of theft by 
deception, a second degree felony. R. 1-4 (addendum A). 
Plea hearing. A change of plea hearing was held in May 2007. R. 104 
(addendum B). Defendant's counsel set forth the plea bargain as memorialized in a 
Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea. R. 31-41 (addendum C). 
Defendant pled guilty to all 11 counts and waived his right to be sentenced in 45 
days. R. 36; 104: 2. He agreed to deposit $1.3 million in his counsel's trust account 
before sentencing in 90 days. Id. "And this money will be paid to the victim 
Richard Waters to compensate him for the monies Mr. Waters previously 
transferred to Mr. Dunn during the years of 2004 and 2005. And they are the monies 
subject to the 11 counts in the present case." R. 104: 2; see also R. 36. The State 
agreed that "once it has verified that Mr. Waters has received the 1.3 million in legal 
funds, it will stipulate to the defendant withdrawing his pleas to the 11 counts and 
the present case will be dismissed." R. 104: 2-3; see also R. 36. No provision was 
made for the possibility that Defendant might not perform. See R. 36; 104. 
Defendant was in prison on a bad check offense at the time of the plea. R. 
104: 3. Defense counsel represented that Defendant "had a parole date last week." 
R. 104: 3. He added that "[t]he Board should release him based upon this 
agreement. The state has also agreed to write a letter to the Board recommending 
that he be released for this time period so he can get these monies together." R. 104: 
3; see also R. 36. The court emphasized to Defendant that it had no control over the 
case on which he was incarcerated. Id. Defendant responded, "Absolutely." R. 
104: 4. 
3 
The court explained to Defendant that he would be pleading to eleven counts 
of theft by deception, a second degree felony, in that he obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the property or services of another by deception with the 
purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and that the property or services exceeded 
$5,000 in value. R. 104: 6-7. The counts were the same except for the dates. See R. 
104: 6-7. 
The court invited the prosecutor to give the factual basis for the pleas. R. 104: 
8. The prosecutor stated that "Mr. Richard Waters transferred monies from [Cache 
County] to accounts under the control of [Defendant]. Each one of these transfers 
was in excess of $5,000." R. 104: 8. The "monies were transferred for a specific 
purpose/7 but Defendant used them "inconsistent to the purpose that they were 
given to [Defendant] for." Id. This misuse of the money, the prosecutor noted, 
"shows an intent to permanently deprive — there were several demands made." R. 
104: 9. And Mr. Waters was in fact deprived of the money. Id. 
Defense counsel stated that he did not think that Defendant would agree to 
this rendition, but that he was "pleading guilty to get out of jail. The reason he 
couldn't get the money back once the demand was made was . . . his probation got 
violated down in Salt Lake County and he got incarcerated so he wasn't able to 
access the money." R. 104:9-10. Consequently, the plea was structured as an Alford 
4 
plea. R. 104:9-10.l The court explained to Defendant the meaning of an Alford plea: 
"That is where, after consultation with your attorney, you have determined that it is 
in your best interest to accept the plea bargain... because you think if you went to 
trial your chances of being convicted are such that you're better off to take this 
plea/7 R. 104:10. 
August status conference. A status conference was held on 20 August 2007, 
three months after the plea hearing. R. 105. Defense counsel reported to the court 
that Defendant "went before the Board on the 12th of August and he's waiting to 
hear back." Id. The court asked Defendant if he anticipated being released soon. 
Id. "I do," he replied. Id. "It's not your fault, it's the prison. . . . I missed the 
original parole date. Unfortunately it's a bureaucracy, extremely slow." Id. He 
stated that he "saw them on the 12th of July," and added, "I'll probably hear back by 
the end of August and hopefully be released the first of September. Not maybe the 
1st, but the first week or so of September." Id. The court gave the Defendant 
another 90 days to come up with the money, continuing the matter until 19 
November 2007. R. 105: 2-3. 
The bench warrant After two more continuances, a status conference was 
held on 3 December 2007, seven months after the plea hearing. R. 47, 50, 53. 
1
 The plea takes its name from North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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Defendant failed to appear and had paid no restitution to date. R. 53-54. A bench 
warrant issued for his arrest. R. 54-56. Defendant bonded out of jail. R. 64. 
Sentencing was scheduled for 14 January 2008. R. 64, 67. 
January hearing. A hearing was held on 14 January 2008, eight months after 
the plea hearing. R. 45-46; 106 (addendum D). Defendant was still in prison; his 
counsel requested an additional 60 days. R. 106: 2. He explained, "The whole 
premise of this case was that he would — once he's released from prison without 
someone monitoring him, as far as restricting his phone call access, he'd be able to 
make arrangements to come up with the restitution." Id. In which case "the state 
was willing to allow him to withdraw his plea." Id. Defendant "finally got paroled 
into Day Reporting Center and also had some surgery." Id. But "now he's back in 
prison." Id. He had a hearing set for January 23, "and he indicates that he may be 
released from prison a couple of weeks after that." Id. Counsel requested more 
time: "He just needs some more time, if the court is willing to grant him another 60 
days. He can then come up with the money and the case can be resolved." Id. 
The court responded, "You know, counsel, that's almost ludicrous. Based on 
his representations in the past and his actions, now you want additional time." Id. 
The victim, Richard Waters, was present, and the court sought input from his 
counsel, Mr. Brown. Id. He responded, "My understanding is that [Defendant] 
could basically give someone power of attorney to get the money. We don't want to 
6 
continue the case, but we're willing to continue the case if he's willing to give a 
power of attorney to his lawyer to get the money." R. 106: 3. He added, "Mr. 
Waters just wants his money back." Id. The court queried whether Brown had "any 
hope at all of getting any of that based on what this man has done so far?" Id. 
Brown responded, "Well, I know he has the money. It's up to him as to whether or 
not he'll give it back." Id. 
The court continued the matter until 11 February 2008, then addressed 
Defendant directly: "Mr. Dunn, I can assure you that this court will do everything it 
can to see that you serve out the balance of your life in prison based on what you've 
done in the past." R. 106: 4. The court warned Defendant that he would run the 
counts consecutive. Id. "If you don't want to serve out the balance of your life in 
prison, then you better come up with that money by the 11th." Id. 
"I can't, sir," replied Defendant. Id. Referring to the plea deal, he stated, "I 
asked for 60 days to cover the 34 days to access the money, so that would give me 
three weeks of the dominoes not falling properly. I was given another 30 days 
beyond that by the prosecutor just because he felt like he wanted to make sure it 
happened." R. 106: 5. He continued, "So far the deal was —that was 100 percent. 
I've never been given one day." Id. 
Defendant gave an unintelligible explanation of his prison time: "Moreover, I 
was sent to prison for not doing a new crime [sic], but for the alleged possibility of 
7 
this crime here, which I— [the prosecutor] even admitted when we pled saying Mr. 
Dunn has come up with an idea here and we can get this resolved/' Id. He also 
spoke unintelligibly of the money he had agreed to repay: "Moreover, when that 
money is deposited into my attorney's account then all the other monies I will have 
access to the account." Id. 
He threatened the victim with legal action: "Then I asked for the possibility of 
going back and filing charges against Mr. Waters for having this happen to me 
because it should not have happened to me." Id. 
He addressed the delay: "I gave you . . . guys the opportunity to hang me if I 
didn't come through, but I haven't had one day. You're frustrated with me, saying 
you've given me ample time. No. I've never once—there's not been any intercourse 
betwixt me or the prison." Id. 
He implied that some blame was due his father: "Then my father gets 
involved and oh, gee." R. 106: 6. He later added, "Then my dad gets involved and 
I'm sent to a halfway house where I'm monitored. I have a clotting problem, but I 
can live on my own. I'm a grown man." R. 106: 7. 
He cast himself as the victim: "I've already released — done everything. I gave 
you guys the opportunity to hang me so I can show my innocence at the same time. 
But I've not been given one day, sir, not even one hour outside of prison." R. 106: 6. 
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Defendant's tone may be inferred from the court's response: "Mr. Perry, after 
all of that tirade, I'm not sure if your client wants to be sentenced today or would 
like to take the deal to the 11th." R. 106: 7. After a few interjections from Defendant 
and the prosecutor, the court interrupted: "That's enough. It appears to the court 
that we're grasping at straws to get all or part of that $1.3 million and it's not 
coming, Mr. Brown. This guy has lied from the day he was born up until now. 
You've heard his spiel here today too." R. 106: 7-8. 
Victim's counsel responded, "I've heard his spiel over and over, a lot more 
than anybody in this room. If he's willing to give power of attorney to Mr. Perry, 
that's the simple question I'd like him to answer today." R. 106: 8. 
Defendant maintained that he was not the cause of the problem: 
I've already said yes. And the deputy — supposedly, when we had our 
pow wow last time, went and verified that the account cannot be 
accessed without myself and Richard [Waters] there in person. So I'm 
taking my own funds and putting them in over here so that Richard 
gets his and then I'm expecting him to go over and release those still. 
So I feel I've been in prison not for doing a new crime, but on the 
alleged of this now for two years. And you say I'm causing problems. 
How am I causing problems? 
Id. 
The court responded, "Let's give him the benefit of the doubt and continue it 
to the 11th at nine. If you can get some money in—" "I can't," interjected 
9 
Defendant. "I told you what I needed, 34 days." Id. The court ruled, "The 11th, 
9:00," but the last word was Defendant's: "Why?" Id. 
Sentencing hearing. A sentencing hearing was finally held on 25 February 
2008, nine months after the plea hearing. R. 107 (addendum E). Defense counsel 
suggested that "this is a case that we ought to maybe have Mr. Dunn examined to 
see if he's competent to proceed." R. 107:2. Defendant interjected, "Can I ask for an 
attorney that would vigorously defend me? I deserve that whether I'm guilty or 
not." Id. 
Defense counsel also made an oral motion to withdraw the guilty plea, 
suggesting that Defendant was incompetent to plead guilty. 107: 3. The court 
responded, "The motion will need to be made in writing. You can do that at a later 
time." Id.2 The court denied both motions as untimely, granted leave for Defendant 
to file written motions at a later time, and proceeded to sentencing. R. 107: 4. 
Counsel stated that Defendant had been unable to repay the $1.3 million 
because he was unable to get out of prison and access his off shore trust: 
Mr. Dunn entered into an agreement where he was hopeful that 
he could get out of prison and get over to the Isle Mann [sic] where 
he's indicated he has the one point three million dollars to pay Mr. 
2
 The court was mistaken on both counts. A motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
need not be in writing. State v. Peterson, 2008 UT App 304, Tf 2,103 P.3d 639. And 
the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a motion to withdraw made after the 
announcement of sentence. State v. Merrill 2005 UT 34, % 20,114 P.3d 585. 
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Waters. He was unable to get out of prison and get access to these 
funds in order to pay the restitution to Mr. Waters. 
Because he's been unable to get out of prison to get access to this 
money, he has not had the benefit of the bargain that was entered into 
in this case. . . . Because of his inability to have access to this money 
that's in the Isle Mann [sic], an off shore trust, because of his 
incarceration status, he's been unable to make restitution. 
R. 107: 4-5. Counsel acknowledged that "[t]he state wrote a letter and tried to help 
him in that matter." R. 107:5. Counsel concluded, "I believe he has a Board date, or 
maybe not." Id. Defendant responded: "The Board said I needed to figure out this 
second thing, which I haven't got to talk to you about yet. Then go back and tell 
them what happened. They're pending right now posing you a question, but I 
haven't even spoken to my attorney." Id. 
The prosecutor described Defendant as "a complete fraud" and submitted the 
matter based on the Presentence Investigation Report:3 
I think the report done by the AP&P agent, Mr. Feltenberger, 
was excellent. I thought he did a great job of explaining what Mr. 
Dunn is all about. Mr. Dunn is a complete fraud and he continues to 
try to —even today it's continually a fraud. He's unlike many 
defendants, or any defendant, frankly, I've ever prosecuted. I think 
Mr. Feltenberger's recommendation is very appropriate. I ask the court 
to sentence the defendant to prison. I'll submit it. 
3
 This report does not appear in the record on appeal. 
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R. 107: 6. Defendant made a rambling statement in which he asserted, "I haven't 
done anything wrong yet/7 R. 107: 8. He later added, "Name one thing where I've 
messed up." R. 107:10. 
The court imposed a $16,500 fine, a $7,729.70 surcharge, restitution of 
$1,149,175 plus interest, and eleven terms of one to fifteen years. R. 107:11; R. 86-88 
(addendum F). The terms on counts 1 through 3 run consecutively to the terms on 
counts 4 through 7, and the terms on counts 8 through 11 run consecutively to the 
other counts. R. 107:11; R. 88. 
Defendant timely appealed. Compare R. 90 with R. 92. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On eleven occasions from May 2004 through January 2006, Defendant 
induced Richard Waters to transfer a total of over one million dollars to Defendant 
for a specified purpose, but used the money for a different purpose. R. 104:8; R. 1-3. 
Each payment exceeded $5,000. R. 104: 8. Defendant intended to, and in fact did, 
permanently deprived Waters of the money. R. 104: 9. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant claims that the court erred by not allowing him to withdraw his 
plea once it became apparent that "it was impossible for him to perform" on the 
plea bargain. This claim fails because the prosecutor did not breach the plea 
bargain. A defendant cannot use his own breach as a reason to withdraw his plea. 
12 
2. Defendant claims that the State failed to present an adequate factual basis 
for his plea, and thus that the court erred in accepting it. This claim fails for two 
reasons. First, it was not preserved in the trial court and Defendant does not argue 
plain error on appeal. His claim is therefore not properly before this Court. Second, 
Defendant cannot establish plain error in any event, because he cannot show harm. 
In the plea withdrawal context, to establish harm a Defendant must assert that, but 
for the claimed illegality, he would not have pled guilty. Defendant has never made 
this assertion, and nothing in the record suggests it is the case. 
3. Finally, Defendant claims that the trial court failed to consider all the 
legally relevant sentencing factors and therefore abused its discretion when it 
sentenced him on consecutive counts. First of all, the trial court did not run the 
prison terms on all 11 counts consecutively. It ran three counts consecutively, and 
the remaining eight counts concurrently with those three. 
In any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The record 
demonstrates the court's familiarity with all the statutory sentencing factors except 
Defendant's rehabilitative needs. That factor was undoubtedly addressed in the 
presentence investigation report. Because the PSI is not included in the record on 
appeal, this Court will assume the regularity of proceedings below —that the trial 




DEFENDANTS INABILITY TO PERFORM HIS PART OF THE 
PLEA BARGAIN BEFORE SENTENCING DID NOT ENTITLE 
HIM TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA 
Defendant claims that the court erred by not allowing him to withdraw his 
plea once it became apparent that "it was impossible for him to perform" on the 
plea bargain. Br. Aplt. at 12. Defendant "requests the court to allow him [to] 
withdraw his plea or extend the timeframe so he can transfer the money back to Mr. 
Waters." Id. 
"A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the 
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West 2004). "Though a legitimate prosecution promise does 
not render a guilty plea legally involuntary, its fulfillment is a necessary predicate to 
a conclusion of voluntariness when a plea 'rests in any significant degree' on it." 
Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,262 (1971)). Accordingly, "when a plea rests in 
any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be 
said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." 
Santobello v. New York 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). 
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In Santobello "the United States Supreme Court recognized for the first time 
that some remedy is constitutionally required wJten tlie State reneges on a promise 
that formed the basis for a plea agreement." State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021,1026 (Utah 
App. 1996) (emphasis added). And "when a plea agreement is breached by the 
prosecutor, the proper remedy is either specific performance of the plea agreement or 
withdrawal of the guilty plea both at the discretion of the trial judge." State v. Smit, 
2004 UT App 222, f 17, 95 P.3d 1203 (emphasis added). 
Here, the State did not renege on a promise or breach a plea agreement. The 
agreement specified that if Defendant repaid the money he stole from Waters, the 
State would stipulate to Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea and dismiss the 
charges. R. 104:2-3; R. 36. Defendant failed to fulfill the agreement because he was 
in prison on a bad check offense. R. 104: 3. He frankly acknowledges that "The 
defendant was unable to perform on the contract." Br. Aplt. at 11. Because 
Defendant did not repay the money, the State's duty to perform was never 
triggered. 
Defendant did not argue below, and does not argue on appeal, that the 
prosecutor breached the plea agreement. Nor could he. At the plea hearing, the 
parties clearly contemplated that Defendant would obtain his own release from 
prison. In fact, defense counsel represented that Defendant "had a parole date last 
15 
week." R. 104: 3. Defense counsel acknowledged below that "[t]he state wrote a 
letter and tried to help him in that matter/7 R. 107: 5. 
Accordingly, although Defendant relies on the contract analogy here, Br. Aplt. 
at 11, he, not the prosecutor, is the party in breach. He is therefore not entitled to 
relief under Santobello and its progeny.4 
II. 
DEFENDANTS CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 
ACCEPTING HIS GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT AN ADEQUATE 
FACTUAL BASIS FAILS BECAUSE IT IS PRESENTED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND DEFENDANT DOES NOT 
ARGUE OR DEMONSTRATE PLAIN ERROR 
Defendant claims that "the State failed to present a factual basis for all the 
elements of the crime/' and that by accepting the plea the court "failed to strictly 
comply with rule 11." Br. Aplt. at 12 (capitalization omitted).5 
4
 Defendant does not rely on or even mention the contractual doctrine of 
impossibility, nor does he claim that its requirements are satisfied on this record. 
See Br. Aplt. at 10-12; see also State v. Chacon, 198 P.3d 749, 752 (Idaho App. 2008). 
5
 Strict compliance with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is no 
longer the standard governing the withdrawal of guilty pleas. 
The statutory standard is found at Utah Code Ann. § 7743-6 (West 2004). 
Before 2003, this statute allowed a defendant to withdraw a plea for "good cause/' 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004), Historical and Statutory Notes. Utah 
courts interpreted this good cause standard to include rule 11 violations. See, e.g., 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987); State v. Tamawiecki, 2000 UT App 186,5 
P.3d 1222. The pre-2003 statutory standard was therefore distinct from the 
constitutional standard, which did not depend on whether the trial court had strictly 
complied with rule 11. See, e.g., State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah App. 1993); 
Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991-92 (Utah 1993). In Salazar, for example, the 
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Defendant's claim fails for two reasons. First, it is unpreserved and 
Defendant does not claim that the trial court committed plain error. And second, 
Defendant cannot establish plain error, because any error was harmless. 
a. Defendant did not preserve this claim below and does not argue 
plain error on appeal. 
Defendant's claim that his guilty plea lacks a factual basis in the record is 
unpreserved. 
"Before a party may advance an issue on appeal, the record must clearly show 
that it was timely presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a 
ruling thereon." Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892,894 n.2 (Utah 1988). 
This preservation rule "is grounded in our adversarial system of justice, which looks 
supreme court held that the knowing and voluntary standard sets forth a "more 
limited" inquiry than that which is required by rule 11, and "a failure to comply 
with Utah's rule 11 in taking a guilty plea" therefore "does not" render a plea 
unknowing and involuntary. Id. at 992. See also Bluemel v. State, 2007 UT 90, f 16, 
173 P.3d 842. 
However, in 2003, the Utah Legislature removed the "good cause" provision 
from § 77-13-6 and replaced it with the constitutional standard. Under the current 
statute, a plea can now be withdrawn "only upon leave of the court and a showing 
that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6. The 
plain language of the 2003 amendment conforms the statutory standard to the 
constitutional one. 
This history is incidental to this case, however, because an adequate factual 
basis is essential under the constitutional standard as well as the old strict 
compliance standard: "a guilty plea . . . cannot be truly voluntary unless the 
defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts." Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 
459, 466 (1969)). 
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to the parties to zealously advocate their cause before an impartial fact finder/' State 
v. King, 2006 UT 3, If 14,131 P.3d 202. "It is axiomatic in our adversary system that a 
party must raise an objection in an earlier proceeding or waive its right to litigate 
the issue in subsequent proceedings/' Bririkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587,589 
(Utah App. 1990) (cited in King, 2006 UT 3, II 14). Thus, Utah courts "have 
consistently held that a defendant who fails to preserve an objection at trial will not 
be able to raise that objection on appeal unless he is able to demonstrate either plain 
error or exceptional circumstances/' King, 2006 UT 3, H 13 (citations omitted). 
To preserve an issue for appellate review, "the grounds for the objection must 
be distinctly and specifically stated," State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 
1989), and made in a "fashion calculated to obtain a ruling thereon/' Doe v. Hafen, 
772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 
P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984)). An appellant must put the trial court on notice of the 
error and support his claim in the trial court with evidence or relevant authority. 
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, Hf 13,14, 95 P.3d 276; State v. Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT App 
219, Iff 10-12,189 P.3d 85. 
Dean illustrates this requirement. Dean filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea in the trial court, stating that the plea was taken in violation of rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at f^ 5. Dean did not specify the basis for the 
alleged violation, alleging only that there were "'two significant departures' from 
18 
due process and equal protection, without further explanation." Id. On appeal, 
Dean argued for the first time that the trial court had committed plain error by not 
advising him of his right to a "speedy public trial before an impartial jury/ ' Id. at % 6. 
The supreme court held that Dean's appellate claim was not properly 
preserved: "Dean's motion to withdraw and the asserted grounds therefor failed to 
put the trial court on notice of the alleged error. Dean did not sufficiently bring the 
issue to the court's attention in his motion to withdraw, nor was it supported by 
evidence or relevant legal authority." Id. at 114. 
Defendant's factual basis claim is similarly unpreserved. Defendant did move 
to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court. At sentencing, defense counsel made 
an oral motion to withdraw Defendant's guilty plea, implying that Defendant was 
incompetent to plead guilty: 
MR. PERRY: We object to proceeding with sentencing at this 
time because in order for him to — once he's sentenced he's not able to 
withdraw his plea. So we'd like to make a motion prior to sentencing 
to see if the plea can be withdrawn. I want to supplement that by 
having him examined by two examiners at the state hospital to see if he 
was competent at the time he entered his plea. 
R. 107: 3. This motion was probably sufficient to preserve an appellate claim that 
Defendant was incompetent to plead guilty. However, Defendant does not assert 
that claim on appeal. And the motion was made in the context of an ongoing 
exchange concerning Defendant's complaint that he had "not had the benefit of the 
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bargain that was entered into in this case/' R. 107:4. It therefore came close enough 
to preserving Defendant's appellate argument for breach of the plea bargain, 
discussed in Point I, that the State does not contest preservation of that claim. 
But Defendant's motion to withdraw did not come close to preserving a claim 
of error going to the adequacy of the plea's factual basis. Defendant never informed 
the trial court that he believed the factual basis for the plea was inadequate. In fact, 
he never mentioned, directly or indirectly, the factual basis for the plea. See R. 107: 
3-4. 
Like Dean's motion, then, Defendant's ''motion to withdraw and the asserted 
grounds therefore failed to put the trial court on notice of the alleged error. 
[Defendant] did not sufficiently bring the issue to the court's attention in his motion 
to withdraw, nor was it supported by evidence or relevant legal authority." Dean, 
2004 UT 63, \ 14. Accordingly, Defendant's appellate claim, like Dean's, "was not 
properly preserved below." Id. 
This does not necessarily conclude the analysis. An appellate court may 
review an unpreserved issue if "the trial court committed plain error or the case 
involves exceptional circumstances." Id. at \ 13. However, where an appellant 
"does not argue that exceptional circumstances or plain error justifies review of the 
issue, [the appellate court will] decline to consider it on appeal." State v. Pledger, 896 
P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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Moreover, a party seeking review of an unpreserved issue must "articulate the 
justification for review in the party's opening brief," not the party's reply brief. State 
v. Finder, 2005 UT15,1 45,114 P.3d 551 (citing Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, f 9, 
17P.3dll22). 
Here, defendant does not in his opening brief argue that exceptional 
circumstances or plain error justifies review of his unpreserved factual basis claim. 
See Br. Aplt. at 12-16. This Court will therefore decline to consider it. This does 
conclude the analysis. 
b. In any event, the trial court did not commit plain error. 
Even if Defendant's failure to preserve this claim and failure to argue any 
exception to the preservation requirement did not conclude the analysis — even if 
this Court were to reach the merits — the trial court did not commit plain error. To 
establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate three elements: "(i) an error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^  13,10 P.3d 346 (quoting 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993)). "If any one of these requirements is 
not met, plain error is not established." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209. 
Here, even assuming arguendo that the first two requirements of the plain 
error doctrine are satisfied, the third is not. The record is bereft of any evidence of 
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harm. "[A] defendant seeking to establish harmful error in the context of a failed 
attempt to withdraw a guilty plea must assert[ ] that but for the alleged error, he or 
she would not have pled guilty/7 Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT App 219, % 15 (quoting 
Dean, 2004 UT 63, f^ 22) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Defendant here, like Diaz-Arevalo, "has not expressly asserted, below or on 
appeal, that he would not have pleaded guilty" to eleven counts of theft by 
deception if the factual basis for that charge "had been properly explained to him/' 
Id. Nor can this Court infer such an assertion from the assertions Defendant does 
advance. Nothing in Defendant's statements in the trial court or this Court would 
support an inference that Defendant was induced to plead guilty by an inadequate 
factual basis for his plea. 
Because Defendant has not asserted, let alone demonstrated, that he would 
not have pled guilty had the factual basis been, in his view, adequate, "he has not 
established harmful error by the district court. Having failed to establish harmful 
error, he has not established plain error, and in the absence of plain error [this 
Court] will not disturb the district court's ruling below." Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT App 
219, If 17. 
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III. 
THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY RUNNING THREE OF DEFENDANT'S 
ELEVEN PRISON TERMS CONSECUTIVELY 
Defendant claims that the trial court failed to consider all the legally relevant 
sentencing factors "and therefore abused its discretion when it sentenced the 
Defendant to the Utah State Prison on consecutive counts/' Br. Aplt. at 19.6 
Proceedings below. After two lengthy sentencing hearings, summarized 
above in the Statement of the Case, the court imposed a fine, a surcharge, restitution, 
and eleven prison terms of one to fifteen years. R. 107:11; R. 86-88. The terms on 
counts 1 through 3 run consecutively to the terms on counts 4 through 7, and the 
terms on counts 8 through 11 run consecutively to the other counts. R. 107:11; R. 88. 
Thus, in effect, three counts run consecutively to each other, while each of the 
remaining eight counts runs concurrently to one of those three. 
Standard of review. The imposition of a sentence "rests entirely within the 
discretion of the [trial] court, within the limits prescribed by law." State v. Peterson, 
681 P.2d 1210,1219 (Utah 1984) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Because trial courts are vested with "wide latitude and discretion in sentencing," 
6
 Although Defendant's third point heading refers to "cruel and unusual 
punishment," Br. Aplt. at 16 (capitalization omitted), the text of his brief refers to 
neither the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution nor Article I, 
Section 9 of the Utah Constitution. Accordingly, the State will treat the issue as a 
common law, rather than a constitutional, attack on his sentence. 
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State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997), this Court will "review a trial 
court's imposition of consecutive sentences for an abuse of discretion/7 State v. 
Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, H 63, 52 P.3d 1194 (citations omitted). "An abuse of 
discretion results when the judge 'fails to consider all legally relevant factors' or if 
the sentence imposed is 'clearly excessive/" State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234,1235 
(Utah 1990) (citations omitted). The reviewing court may find an abuse of discretion 
only if it concludes that "no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by 
the trial court" State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885,887 (Utah 1978). " '[T]he burden is on 
[the defendant] to show that the trial court did not properly consider all the 
factors/" Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432 at % 28, 82 P.3d 1167 (second alteration in 
original) (quoting State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 16,40 P.3d 626). 
Because sentencing courts enjoy wide latitude in determining the appropriate 
sentence, challenges to consecutive sentences rarely succeed. See, e.g., State v. Warby, 
2009 UT App 6; State v. Johnson, 2008 UT App 279; State v. Jimenez, 2007 UT App 116, 
158 P.3d 1128; State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511,153 P.3d 804; State v. Hall, 2006 
UT App 88; State v. Lehman, 2004 UT App 404. 
Sentencing considerations. A sentencing court has the discretion to impose 
consecutive sentences when a defendant has been convicted of more than one felony 
offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004). Subsection (2) of section 76-3-
401 requires the court to consider several enumerated factors: 
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In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of 
the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
The statute no longer contains a presumption in favor of concurrent sentences. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1), (4) (West 2004).7 
The sentencing court is not required to make record findings on each of the 
statutory sentencing factors; rather, when evidence of those factors appears on the 
record, a reviewing court will assume that the trial court considered them. See State 
v. Helms, 2002 UT12, If 11,40 R3d 626 ("[W]e will not assume that the trial court's 
silence, by itself, presupposes that the court did not consider the proper [sentencing] 
factors as required by law/') 
Record on appeal. "Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review 
have the duty and responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate 
record. State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993). "Thus, the appellant has the 
burden of providing the reviewing court with an adequate record on appeal to 
prove his allegations/7 Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 R2d 1049,1052 (Utah App. 
1990) (citing Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989)); accord State v. 
Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982). "[I]f an appellant fails to provide an 
7
 The version of this statute construed in State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 
1998), the case upon which defendant primarily relies, contained a presumption in 
favor of concurrent sentences. See Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. 
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adequate record on appeal, this Court must assume the regularity of the 
proceedings below/' State v. Cramer, 2002 UT 9, % 28,44 P.3d 690 (citation omitted). 
Analysis. To begin with, the record on appeal is incomplete. A presentence 
report was prepared in this case. See R. 107:2 (Defense counsel: "Mr. Dunn needs a 
few minutes to read the presentence report/7) In fact, the prosecutor submitted the 
sentencing issue based on the presentence report: "I think the report done by the 
AP&P agent, Mr. Feltenberger, was excellent/' R. 107: 6. Yet no presentence 
investigation report appears in the record on appeal. Because Defendant has not 
made the presentence report part of the record on appeal, "there is nothing before 
this Court to determine whether the trial court's use of that report amounted to an 
abuse of discretion. Absent a record, this Court presumes regularity in the 
proceedings below." State v. Eloge, 762 P.2d 1,2 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Nuttall, 
861 P.2d 454,458 n. 12 (Utah App. 1993) (stating review of sentencing issue limited 
when presentence report not made part of record on appeal). The court trial here 
having ordered a presentence report, and absent any contrary evidence "it must, 
therefore be presumed that the court did what the statute pr[e]scribed." State v. 
Beck, 584 P.2d 870,872 (Utah 1978) (affirming consecutive sentences despite lack of 
record that court considered gravity of offense). 
At sentencing there was little explicit discussion of "the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and 
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rehabilitative needs of the defendant/7 Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004). 
These factors were undoubtedly referenced at length in the presentence report. In 
addition, clues in the record reveal the court's awareness of each factor. 
The gravity of the offense was, of course, discussed at length over the nine 
months from plea to sentence: Defendant stole $1.3 million from the victim in a 
string of 11 fraudulent acts. Similarly, the number of victims is indisputable: one. 
Defendant's character was on display throughout the various hearings held by the 
court in an effort to accommodate Defendant's failure to perform on the plea 
bargain. Over a series of months he attempted to evade responsibility for the 
failure of the plea bargain, insisting to the end that "I haven't done anything wrong 
yet." R. 107: 8. The court expressed its assessment of Defendant's character when, 
without contradiction from counsel, it hyperbolically declared that Defendant "has 
lied from the day he was born up until now." R. 106: 7-8. Only Defendant's 
rehabilitative needs were not touched upon in one hearing or another. They were 
presumably addressed in the presentence report. Because the PSI was not included 
in the record on appeal, this Court will assume the regularity of the proceedings 
below, i.e., that the trial court reviewed the PSI and acted in light of the information 
it contained. 
The actual sentence imposed on Defendant was carefully calibrated. The court 
did not simply "impose[] consecutive sentences," Br. Aplt. at 20, but ran the terms 
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on counts 1 through 3 consecutive to the terms on counts 4 through 7, and the terms 
on counts 8 through 11 consecutive to the other counts. R. 107:11; R. 88. Thus, as 
noted above, the court in effect ran three terms consecutively and the remaining 
eight terms concurrently to those three. 
Given the deference due to sentencing courts on appeal, the presumption in 
favor of regularity where the appellant has failed to complete the record on appeal, 
and indications in the record that the trial court considered the relevant sentencing 
factors, this Court should conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
imposing this measured sentence upon Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted May 14, 2009. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
UtalwAttorney General 
/ J .^EBERKI VOROS, JRT 
/ Assistant Attorney General 
C ^(IgAnsel for Appellee 
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380 E 4TH AVE #A 
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judge /T^Akms 
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The undersigned Tony C. Baird, Deputy Cache County Attorney, under oath states 
on information and belief that the defendant, in Cache County, State of Utah, committed 
the following crime(s): 
COUNT 1: 
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-405, as follows: 
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 5/18/2004, obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception, 
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the 
(i) value of the property or services was or exceeded $5,000; 
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another. 
COUNT 2: 
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-405, as follows: 
LOGAN COURTS 
2037 JAN 10 FH 2:1,3 
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 7/16/2004, obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception, 
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the 
(i) value of the property or services was or exceeded $5,000; 
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another. 
COUNT 3: 
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-405, as follows: 
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 7/16/2004, obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception, 
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the 
(i) value of the property or services wras or exceeded $5,000; 
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another. 
COUNT 4: 
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-405, as follows: 
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 7/16/2004, obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception, 
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the 
(i) value of the property or services was or exceeded $5,000; 
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another. 
COUNT 5: 
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-405, as follows: 
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 7/16/2004, obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception, 
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the 
(i) value of the property or services was or exceeded $5,000; 
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another. 
COUNT 6: 
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-405, as follows: 
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 7/26/2004, obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception, 
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the 
(i) value of the property or services was or exceeded $5,000; 
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another. 
COUNT 7: 
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-405, as follows: 
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 1/20/2005, obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception, 
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the 
(i) value of the property or services was or exceeded $5,000; 
(iv) property wras stolen from the person of another. 
COUNT 8: 
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-405, as follows: 
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 1/21/2005, obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception, 
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the 
(i) value of the property or services was or exceeded $5,000; 
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another. 
COUNT 9: 
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-405, as follows: 
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 7/23/2005, obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception, 
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the 
(i) value of the property or services wras or exceeded $5,000; 
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another. 
COUNT 10: 
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-405, as follows: 
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 8/8/2005, obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception, 
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the 
(i) value of the property or services wras or exceeded $5,000; 
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another. 
COUNT 11: 
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-405, as follows: 
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 1/6/2006, obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception, 
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the 
(i) value of the property or services was or exceeded $5,000; 
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness(es): 
MIKE PETERSON, SLCPD 
Authorized this January 10, 2007 for presentment arfd filing: 
By ^ M / / ^ , 
Tony C. Baird V. 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
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THE COURT: Let's take the case of State of Utah 
versus Larry Douglas Dunn. This is the time set for a 
pretrial conference. Mr. Perry, obviously your negotiations 
have been successful. Will you verbalize for me your 
arrangement, please. 
MR. PERRY: Your Honor, we prepared a written plea 
agreement. In that agreement it sets forth all of the terms. 
The court has the copy. What basically Mr. Dunn is going to 
plead guilty to is the 11 counts. He's going to waive his 
right to a preliminary hearing and plead guilty to the 11 
counts. The state will then release him on his own 
recognizance. We'll waive our right to be sentenced within 
90 days, or within 45 days. And we'll set sentencing in 90 
days . 
During that 90 day time frame Mr. Dunn, if he has a 
passport, will turn it over to me or his probation or parole 
officer. He agrees to deposit $1.3 million in my trust 
account. And this money will be paid to the victim Richard 
Waters to compensate him for the monies Mr. Waters previously 
transferred to Mr. Dunn during the years of 2004 and 2005. 
And they are the monies subject to the 11 counts in the 
present case. 
The state agrees that upon entering the guilty pleas to 
the 11 counts they will stipulate to his own recognizance for 
a period of 90 days. The state further agrees that once it 
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has verified that Mr. Waters has received the 1.3 million in 
legal funds, it will stipulate to the defendant withdrawing 
his pleas to the 11 counts and the present case will be 
dismissed. 
They've also agreed that if he has any problems with --
he had a parole date last week. The Board should release him 
based upon this agreement. The state has also agreed to 
write a letter to the Board recommending that he be released 
for this time period so he can get these monies together. 
THE COURT: So it's anticipated that with this 
agreement he will be released from the Utah State Prison? 
MR. BAIRD: Yeah. We'll ask the court to make sure 
that there's an OR release in this case, his own recognizance 
release. 
THE COURT: What is he in prison for now? 
MR. BAIRD: A bad check, I think, a bad check 
offense. 
THE COURT: Out of which court? 
MR. BAIRD: Salt Lake. 
MR. PERRY: Third District. 
THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, you understand and realize 
that if the court approves this thing here today and I 
release you on your own recognizance on this case, I don't 
have any control over whatever that other case is down at the 
prison? 
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THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely. I'm still on parole 
until 2027. 
THE COURT: But you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: The state is comfortable that he will be 
released and can follow through on this arrangement that has 
been made. 
Vr. Dunn, you've been incarcerated, but have you consumed 
any alcohol or drugs before coming in here today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Not drugs, but I take medications. 
And they're nonpsychotropic. 
THE COURT: Those medications that you are taking oo 
not affect your ability to make a reasoned decision right 
now; is that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: They don't. 
THE COURT: Do you feel you've had ample opportunity 
to discuss this matter with your attorney, Mr. Perry? 
THE DEFENDANT: Very much so. 
THE COURT: Do you feel that you understand what is 
going on nere today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Very well, yes. 
THE COURT: Has anyone promised you or threatened 
you with anything to get you to plead guilty to these 11 
counts other than as set forth in this document or 
represented to the court by your attorney? 
4 
THE DEFENDANT: 
THE COURT: You 
No, sir. 
understand that any recommendation 
made to me as to what sentence you should receive would be a 
recommendation only and I may or may not accept the 
recommendation, do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: 
would have the authority 
THE COURT: 
that, but you need t 
recommendations, eve 
reason at this point 
After I've done X, Y and Z you still 
to not dismiss the case? 
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y well. Has the defendant waived his 
Your Honor. 
He needs to do that. 1 
understand that this statement of 
rights you have as relates to a 
Yes. 
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THE COURT: And the purpose of a preliminary hearing 
is to ascertain whether or not the state can show that 
there1s probable cause to believe that the offenses you were 
charged with were committed and you were the person who 
committed those. This sets forth those rights. By signing 
this document you give up your right to that preliminary 
hearing, you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: This document does appear to bear your 
signature. You signed this before it was submitted to me; is 
that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Immediately, right now. 
THE COURT: Very well. The counts that I understand 
you will be pleading guilty to are all second degree 
felonies. They appear to all be theft by deception. If 11 
read count one. Theft by deception, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-405. The 
information alleges that the defendant did, on or about May 
18th, 2004, obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the 
property of another by deception with the purpose to deprive 
the owner thereof. The value of the property or services was 
or exceeded $5000. Or the property was stolen from the 
person of another. 
Count two is exactly the same as the first, except the 
date there is July 16th, 2004. Count three is the same as 
6 
count two, including the date. As is count four and 
five is the same. Count six is the same as those pre 
described except the date there is July 26th, 2004. 
seven is also the same, theft by deception. The date 
is January 20th of 2005. Count eight is the same as 
previously set forth, except the date is January 21st 
Count nine is the same, except the date is January --
me, July 23rd, 2005. Count ten is theft by deception 
previously described, with the date being August 8th, 
And count 11 is, again, theft by deception, the same 
previously described, except the date is January 6th, 
To those 11 counts, Mr. Dunn, how do you plead? 
THE DEFENDANT: Can I make a suggestion? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
THE DEFENDANT: What's the date on the first 
THE COURT: The date on the first one is May 
2004. 
THE DEFENDANT: You might want to have me pi 
guilty — you said the first one, have me just do the 
ones. I was incarcerated then. Itfs just a matter o 
I was incarcerated at that time. I'm pleading guilty 
of them, but --
MR. BAIRD: It's on or about. 

















THE COURT: All right. To those 11 counts how do 
7 
1 you plead? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Baird, give us the factual basis for 
4 the 11 counts. 
5 MR. BAIRD: On the dates -- on or about the dates 
6 alleged m the information, from a source here in Cache 
7 County, state of Utah, Mr. Richard Waters transferred monies 
8 from here to accounts under the control of Mr. Dunn. Each 
9 one of these transfers was in excess of $5,000. 
10 Mr. Waters, if called to testify, would testify that 
11 these monies were transferred for a specific purpose. And 
12 that these monies were received by Mr. Dunn and Mr. Dunn 
13 acknowledged that he received these amounts. 
14 That subsequently, some several months later, Mr. Waters 
15 demanded that the defendant give the monies back and the 
16 defendant has not returned those funds. The state would 
17 present evidence that these funds were used inconsistently --
18 inconsistent to the purpose that they were given to Mr. Dunn 
19 for. Thus Mr. Dunn exercised unauthorized control over the 
20 funds. Along with the other elements, those are the facts 
21 that we would prove. 
22 THE COURT: When you indicate to us, Mr. Baird, that 
23 the money was used for other purposes than what was 
24 originally designated by Mr. Waters, apparently that was for 
25 the purpose of depriving Mr. Waters of the benefit of that 
money; is that correct? Is that what you're maintaining? 
MR. BAIRD: When the money was used inconsistent for 
1 ^ 
the purpose for which Mr. Waters gave it to Mr. Dunn, and 
then subsequently not returning the money, refusing to return 
it, it shows an intent to permanently deprive -- there were 
several demands made. Mr. Dunn may not agree with all of 
these facts, but this is the evidence we would present, that 
the money was given to him for, among other things, a 
business venture and some other things. But in any event the 
monies -- the state would present evidence, bank records, to 
show that the monies were used inconsistent for the purpose 
for which it was given to him. 
THE COURT: And that Mr. Waters was deprived of the 
money? 
MR. BAIRD: Yes. He's never received the money 
back. 
THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, you've heard the facts as 
related to us by Mr. Baird. Are you pleading guilty because 
you committed the offenses as he described them? 
MR. PERRY: I don't think he would agree to that. 
Maybe we might have to do it on an Alford basis. He's 
pleading guilty to get out of jail. The reason he couldn't 
get the money back once the demand was made was his probation 
officer -- his probation got violated down in Salt Lake 
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in this case? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Very well. The court will accept the 
plea, designating it as an Alford type plea. But I need to 
assure you that in doing that, if you don't follow through on 
this arrangement and it becomes necessary for this court to 
pass sentence, you are sentenced the same as if you admitted 
you performed the acts. The court will accept it as a guilty 
plea, you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Very well. The court will accept and 
designate it as an Alford type plea. I will sign the order 
containing the statement of defendant and incorporate that 
into the record. Pursuant to your agreement, the court will 
authorize the defendant's release on his own recognizance 
pursuant to the terms and conditions in the statement of 
defendant. 
Counsel, how are we going to review this? How do you 
want to handle that? 
MR. PERRY: Set it for a sentencing date in 90 days, 
I guess. 
THE COURT: Set it for sentencing, is that what you 
want to do? I guess there's no need for a PSI in this case. 
Who is going to report back to the court if he's performed 
all of the obligations? 
11 
MR. BAIRD: We will. I guess, frankly, what we 
probably ought to do, because otherwise he'll have to be 
referred to AP&P for a statement and that sort of thing. I 
would suggest that we set it for a status hearing 90 days 
out, 90 days from this coming Monday. And then at that time 
we111 know whether everything has been fulfilled. If not, I 
guess set it for sentencing. 
THE DEFENDANT: Can I ask a question? 
THE COURT: Ask your attorney and he can bring it to 
my attention. 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
MR. PERRY: His question was if he has the money 
sooner than 90 days can we come back before the court and 
have this dismissed. My answer was ITm sure the state 
wouldn't oppose a dismissal if the money is returned. 
THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, we handle routine matters 
every Monday. If you get this thing taken care of before 
that, notify your attorney. Mr. Perry knows how to put it on 
the next Monday's calendar. 
All right. We'll schedule it for the 20th of August at 
ten. The court will designate that as a status conference. 
I'll expect the parties to come prepared at that time to 
represent to me whether or not -- in as much as we don't have 
AP&P or someone monitoring it, the attorneys will have to be 
prepared to come and tell me what the status of the case is 
12 
that day. 
All right. Have we covered all of the bases? 
MR. PERRY: I did say this earlier on the record, 
but, Mr. Dunn, are you willing to waive your right to be 
sentenced within 45 days? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: I appreciate that Mr. Perry. Anything 
else that we should take care of? 
MR. PERRY: Nothing that I have. 
THE COURT: Mr. Baird, have we covered everything in 
this matter? 
MR. BAIRD: I believe so, yes. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
THE BAILIFF: Court is in recess. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the videotaped hearing was 
transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court 
Reporter and Certified Court Tape Transcriber in and for 
the State of Utah. 
That a full, true and correct transcription of the 
hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the 
pages numbered 2 to 13, inclusive. 
I further certify that the original transcript was 
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Cache 
County, Logan, Utah. 
Dated this 5th day of September, 2008. 
C ^ ^ 
Roaney MV Felshaw, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
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Addendum C 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARRY P. DUNN. 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 071100069 
Judge: Clint S. Judkins 
I, Larry D. Dunn, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and 
that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Waiver of Preliminary Hearing 
I understand that I am waiving my right to a preliminary hearing. A preliminary 
hearing is a procedure to determine probable cause and to inform an accused of the 
charges against him or her. Competent evidence which shows probable cause that the 
charged crime was committed and that the defendant committed it is sufficient to hold an 
accused to answer. The evidence does not have to be sufficient for a conviction at trial. 
I understand that at a preliminary hearing, an accused has the right to be 
represented by counsel. If an accused cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to 
represent him or her. 
I understand, that an accused may call and compel witnesses to testify on his or her 
behalf, and confront and cross examine any witnesses the State may call to testify. I 
understand that an accused may testify on his or her behalf, or remain silent and say 
nothing. In order to proceed with my plea today, I waive my preliminary hearing. 
ENT'D MAY 1 4 2007 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
Crime & Statutory Provision Degree Minimum Mandatory 
A. Theft by Deception (Eleven Counts) 2nd Felony 1 -15 yrs Prison 
$10,000 Fine + 85% surcharge 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of the ciimes(s) to which I 
am pleading guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty7 (or no contest) will are 
as stated in the criminal information filed in this case. See Information on file in this 
case. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute 
or contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons 
for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my 
guilty (or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crimes(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty ( or no contest): The facts are those stated by the prosecutor in open court 
during the plea hearing. 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all die following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I 
understand that I might alter, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay 
for the appointed lawyer's service to me. 
I have not wraived my right to counsel. I am represented by David Perry. 
I certify that I have read this statement and that I understand the nature and 
elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I also 
understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty (or 
no contest) plea(s). 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the 
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to 
have a jury trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified 
against me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have 
the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance 
and testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, 
the State would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to 
have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I 
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against 
myself. I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could 
not hold my refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead 
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of 
the charged crimes(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not 
guilty," and my case will be set for a trial At a trial, the State would have the burden of 
proving each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a 
jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me 
guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford 
the costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am 
giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty or no contest, I am waiving 
and giving up all the statutory and constitutional right as explained above. 
~ >/ 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving 
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, 
or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eight-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part 
of a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one 
crime involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they 
may run at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine 
for each crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting 
sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead 
guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive 
sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty 
occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose 
consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive 
sentences would be inappropriate. 
Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of a 
plea bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including 
those explained below: 
A. I agree to plead guilty to the eleven counts of Theft by Deception as charged in 
the Information in the present case, each a second degree felony. 
B. If not already in the possession of my probation/parole officer, I agree to turn 
my passport(s) over to my attorney, David Perry, until this case is concluded. I further 
agree not leave the State of Utah without first obtaining written approval from my 
probation/parole officer and the State's attorney in this case. 
C. I agree to deposit $1,300,000.00 (U.S. dollars) into the trust account of my 
defense attorney, David Perry, within 90 days of entering the guilty pleas in this case and 
being released from the Utah State Prison. This money will be paid to Richard Waters to 
compensate Mm for the monies Mr. Waters previously transferred to me during the years 
of 2004 and 2005 (as outlined in the State's discovery). These monies are the subject of 
the eleven counts in the present case. 
D. The State agrees that upon me entering guilty pleas to the eleven counts 
discussed above, it will stipulate to an own recognisance release for a period of 90 days. 
^ W w , +KLS\*Jb will lor*'t& AU&K "k iQl ibwJ / A w / y J J ^ c ^ htfaffr* . 
E. The State farther agrees that once it has reasonably verified that Mr. Waters has 
received the $1,300,000.00 in legal funds, it will stipulate to me withdrawing my pleas to 
the eleven counts and the present case will be dismissed. 
Trial Judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are 
not binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what 
they believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of 
unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). 
No promises except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any 
changes because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am JX Years of age. I have attended school through the ''/ grade. I can 
read and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter 
has been provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or 
intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am net 
presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my 
judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any 
mental disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I 
am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I 
must file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I 
understand that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea 
agreement must be made within 30 days of pleading guilty (or no contest). I will 
only be allowed to withdraw my plea if 1 show that it was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made. I understand that any challenge to my plea(s) made after 
sentencing must be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in title 78, 
Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this / Day of. II of M/H ,20 07 
,arry D. Dunn 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for , the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I 
have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understand the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and 
belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual 
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly state; and these, along with the 
other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, 




Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
, defendant. I have reviewed this 
Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct 
which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or 
coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully 
contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the 
record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would 
support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered 
and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Tony C. Baird 
Bar No.: 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court 
witnesses the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are 
freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
It IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this Day of. \M*~1 2067, 
Addendum D 
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Transcript of Pretrial Conference. 
Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding, 
First District Court Courthouse 
Logan, Utah 
January 14, 2008 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant 
TONY C. BAIRD 
Deputy County Attorney 
DAVID M. PERRY 
Attorney at Law 
RODNEY M. FELSHAW 
Registered Professional Reporter 
First District Court 
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THE COURT: State versus Lari "y Douglas Dunn. This 
is the time set for sentencing on 11 counts of theft by 
deception, all second degree felonies. 
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MR. PERRY: Your Honor, we!d 
to continue sentencing. Mr. Dunn has 
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of weeks after that. 
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Any reason why 
time? 
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a hearing on the 23rd 
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make arrangements to come up with the 
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paroled into Day Reporting Center and 
Then my understanding is now he's back 
this hearing set on the 23rd of Januar 
some more time, if the court is willin 
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be resolved. 
THE COURT: You know, counsel 
ss, he'd be able to 
restitution. If he 
state was willing to 
ea he finally got 
also had some surgery. 
in prison. And he has 
y, 8:00. He just needs 
g to grant him another 
money and the case can 
, that'3 almost 
ludicrous. Based on his representations in the past and his 
actions, now you want additional time. 
Brown on that. 
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know he has the money. It's up 
e'll give it back. With the 
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d, input from the state. 
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takes. If m fact he does have it. 
what it takes to come up with it. 
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THE DEFENDANT: I can't, sir. The deal was --I've 
never messed up with your not once. I though" actually that 
you were quite amenable and understanding. The prosecutor 
needed to bust my balls and be the tough guy and I understand 
4 
that. But you clearly — the deal was signed by you and you 
knew what it entailed. I asked for 60 days to cover the 34 
days to access the money, so that would give me three weeks 
of the dominoes not falling properly. I was given another 30 
days beyond that by the prosecutor just because he felt like 
he wanted to make sure it happened. So far the deal was --
that was 100 percent. I've never been given one day. 
Moreover, I was sent to prison for not doing a new crime, 
but for the alleged possibility of this crime here, which 
I -- Mr. Baird even admitted when we pled saying Mr. Dunn has 
come up with an idea here and we can get this resolved. He's 
given us the opportunity to hang him, but at the same time he 
also gets to prove he's innocent. 
Moreover, when that money is deposited into my attorney's 
account then all the other monies I will have access to the 
account. Then I asked for the possibility of going back and 
filing charges against Mr. Waters for having this happen to 
me because it should not have happened to me. That's why I 
gave you the guys the opportunity to hang me if I didn't come 
through, but I haven't had one day. You're frustrated with 
me, saying you've given me ample time. No. I've never 
once -- there's not been any intercourse betwixt me or the 
prison. I haven't received one letter -- I'm not sure this 
is true, but I bet Mr. Baird hasn't gone to my attorney and 
said I haven't heard from Junior, what's going on. Maybe he 
5 
did, I'm not sure, but my attorney would have let me know 
there was concern. Nothing has happened. 
Then my father gets involved and oh, gee. I ve already 
released -- done everything. I gave you the guys the 
opportunity to hang me so I can show my innocence at the same 
time. But I've not been given one day, sir, not 
hour outside of prison. 
THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, are you telling me 
proceed with sentencing today? 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't know what to do. 
even one 
» you want to 
I thought 
you were actually -- remember when you said, Junior, I can 
still sentence you after you raise the money and I said I 
understand that. I don't have to go with the state's 
recommendation you said. But you said if you do 
money it was likely that you would go ahead with 
the state withdraw the charges. I thought you ac 
being very helpful. 
Now you're saying I have been given all this 
haven't done anything. I've just been sitting in 
waiting for this to happen. There's things that 
didn't share with you that happened with the 3oar 
they finally found out in mid October that I wasn 
sentenced, or released yet, Ms. Cheryl, and I don 
I think it's Ms. Cheryl Atkins, said, what, this 
been done yet. If I can find two board members I 
pay the 
that and let 
tually were 





' t know but 
deal hasn't 
'11 have it 
6 
done today. 
Then my dad gets involved and I'm sent to a halfway house 
where I'm monitored. I have a clotting problem, but I can 
live on my own. I'm a grown man. 
THE COURT: Mr. Perry, after all of that tirade, I'm 
not sure if your client wants to be sentenced today or would 
like to take the deal to the 11th. 
THE DEFENDANT: The 11th doesn't matter. 
THE COURT: We might as well proceed today then, I 
suppose. 
THE DEFENDANT: I said I need 34 days for the domino 
effect. What I'd like to have is a safety net of three 
weeks. I asked for 60 days. Then Mr. Baird said give him 90 
days. But I need at least 34 days with no problems 
whatsoever on the domino effect. 
MR. BAIRD: Your Honor, the state is convinced that 
Mr. Dunn is not going to do what he agreed to do. We're 
wasting our time to continue it to the 11th. He's not going 
to do it. Now, I understand that the victim would like to 
get his money, but this man isn't going to do what he needs 
to do to get the money, if it even exists at all. 
THE DEFENDANT: Then why did you sign on the deal --
THE COURT: That's enough. It appears to the court 
that we're grasping at straws to get all or part of that 
$1.3 million and it's not coming, Mr. Brown. This guy has 
7 
1 lied from the day he was born up until now. You've heard his 
2 spiel here today too. 
3 MR. BROWN: I've heard his spiel over and over, a 
4 lot more than anybody in this room. If he's willing to give 
5 power of attorney to Mr. Perry, that's the simple question 
6 I'd like him to answer today. 
7 THE DEFENDANT: I've already said yes. And the 
8 deputy -- supposedly, when we had our pow wow last time, went 
9 and verified that the account cannot be accessed without 
10 myself and Richard there in person. So I'm taking my own 
11 funds and putting them in over here so that Richard gets his 
12 and then I'm expecting him to go over and release those 
13 still. So I feel I've been in prison not for doing a new 
14 crime, but on the alleged of this now for two years. And you 
15 say I'm causing problems. How am I causing problems? 
16 THE COURT: Let's give him the benefit of the doubt 
17 and continue it to the 11th at nine. If you can get some 
18 money in --
19 TKE DEFENDANT: I can't. I told you what I needed, 
20 34 days. 
21 MR. BROWN: Continue it to the 11th, Judge? 
2 2 THE COURT: The 11th, 3:00. 
2 3 THE DEFENDANT: Why? 
24 (Hearing concluded.) 
25 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the videotaped hearing was 
transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court 
Reporter and Certified Court Tape Transcriber in and for 
the State of Utah. 
That a full, true and correct transcription of the 
hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the 
pages numbered 2 to 8, inclusive. 
I further certify that the original transcript was 
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Cache 
County, Logan, Utah. 
Dated this 8th day of September, 2008. 
Rodney M/ Felshaw, C.S.R., R.P.R" 
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THE COURT: Let's take State versus Larry Douglas 
Dunn. Mr. Perry, I show that this is the time set for 
sentencing on 11 counts, all theft by deception, all second 
degree felonies. Any reason why sentence should not be 
passed at this time? 
MR. PERRY: Your Honor, I think this is a case that 
we ought to maybe have Mr. Dunn examined to see if he's 
competent to proceed. I'll file the petition and ask the 
court to stay sentencing until the state can look at him and 
see if he understood what he was doing when he entered his 
plea or not. 
THE DEFENDANT: Can I ask for an attorney that would 
vigorously defend me? I deserve that whether I'm guilty or 
not. 
THE COURT: Mr. Baird, input from the state on Mr. 
Perry's motion? 
MR. BAIRD: May we approach? 
THE COURT: Come forward. 
(Sidebar, not recorded.) 
THE COURT: The court has had an opportunity to 
visit with counsel at the bench, Mr. Perry, anything 
further? 
MR. PERRY: Mr. Dunn needs a few minutes to read the 




with him. It's time 
MR. PERRY: 
You've had ample opportunity 
to proceed. 
I make a motion to withdraw h 
pleas that he entered. 
THE COURT: 
writing. You can dc 
MR. 




s not a 
The motion will need to be ma 
that at a later time. 
We object to proceeding with 
in order for him to -- once h 
ble to withdraw his plea. So 
to make a motion prior to sentencing to see if the 
be withdrawn. I want to supplement that by having 
examined by two examiners at the state hospital to 
was competent 
THE 
. at the 
COURT: 
comments at the bene 
the record. 
MR. BAIRD: 
with sentencing toda 














time he entered his plea. 
Mr. Baird, the court has hear 
h, but I'll hear what you have 
We oppose that. We'd like to 
y. If counsel wants to file a 
respond to it then. 
Anything further, Mr. Perry? 









see if he 
d your 




made -- we want to make a petition to 
!s competent to proceed. Once 
Honor, as you well know that s 
we make 
tays all 
can't proceed with anything further until 
3 
that issue is resolved, unless you want to have a hearing to 
see whether the petition is valid. That still stays all 
proceedings. 
I make that petition at this time in behalf of Mr. Dunn 
to stay all proceedings so that we can determine whether he 
was competent at the time he entered his plea and whether his 
plea should be withdrawn or not. 
THE COURT: Mr. Perry, this matter has been pending 
for ITm not sure how long. The court finds that your motions 
are untimely. I'll allow you to file those in writing if you 
so desire, but the court will proceed with sentencing today. 
Anything else you'd like to place on the record? 
MR. PERRY: Mr. Dunn entered into an agreement where 
he was hopeful that he could get out of prison and get over 
to the Isle Mann where he's indicated he has the one point 
three million dollars to pay Mr. Waters. He was unable to 
get out of prison and get access to these funds in order to 
pay the restitution to Mr. Waters. 
Because he's been unable to get out of prison to get 
access to this money, he has not had the benefit of the 
bargain that was entered into in this case. That being that 
once he paid the 1.3 million the state would stipulate to him 
being able to withdraw his plea and the charges be dismissed. 
Because of his inability to have access to this money that's 
in the Isle Mann, an off shore trust, because of his 
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incarceration status, he's been unable to make restitution. 
Had he been able to make restitution we wouldn't be 
proceeding with sentencing today and the charges would be 
dismissed. 
Mr. Dunn is confident that he has that money there. He 
believes the money is there. He just needs to be able to 
access the money and then Mr. Waters can be made whole. By 
sentencing him to prison it will delay that. And plus it 
will -- he may be in prison a long time. He pled straight up 
to the charges with the understanding that he thought he 
would be able to get out of prison and get the money. The 
state wrote a letter and tried to help him in that matter. 
Because of different factors he's been unable to -- he 
was released to a halfway house, but they would not allow him 
telephone access or any type of pass to be able to access 
this money. Therefore he's still in prison. I believe he 
has a Board date, or maybe not. 
THE DEFENDANT: I went to the Board. 
MR. PERRY: You went to the Board and don't have a 
date? 
THE DEFENDANT: The Board said I needed to figure 
out this second thing, which I haven't got to talk to you 
about yet. Then go back and tell them what happened. 
They're pending right now posing you a question, but I 
haven't even spoken to my attorney. 
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THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. PERRY: Anything you want to say to the Judge? 
This is the time for sentencing, Mr. Dunn. 
THE COURT: Mr. Baird, input from the state? 
MR. BAIRD: I think the report done by the AP&P 
agent, Mr. Feltenberger, was excellent. I thought he did a 
great job of explaining what Mr. Dunn is all about. Mr. Dunn 
is a complete fraud and he continues to try to -- even today 
it's continually a fraud. He's unlike many defendants, or 
any defendant, frankly, I've ever prosecuted. I think Mr. 
Feltenberger's recommendation is very appropriate. I ask the 
court to sentence the defendant to prison. I'll submit it. 
THE DEFENDANT: Can I say something, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
THE DEFENDANT: I came up with this idea. I asked 
originally for a pow wow to all get together so the 
prosecution could see that Richard was all on board and 
understanding. The prosecution saw that. Mr. Baird listened 
to Richard, what he said. Everything that I W e said is 
exactly one line linear after the next. 
I said that this deal had to be done before May 8th. The 
prison did not transport me on -- was it the 5th? The Friday 
beforehand I had court here and for no reason at all the 
prison didn't transport me. Your assistant sent it in, maybe 
this lady here sent it in, but I wasn't transported. 
6 
The deal needed to be done before May 8th is what the 
Board said and then I would be released on May 8th last year. 
It wasn't done before May 8th. I came actually on Friday, a 
week after -- four days after I was to be released. So now I 
lost that May 8th Board date. I even said to you on that 
date, and it's on the video or the transcript, I said I could 
be another three to six months before I get released. 
I come back and meet with you and I was still cheery. I 
said to you I've seen the Board, they told me I'd be released 
July 31st, but it's now August 20th. Clearly something is 
arrears. 
I went back and my captain, Hughes, who doesn't like 
inmates, threatened me saying if I'm not telling the truth 
I'd go to max. He took me at my word and called the Board. 
The Board lost my file. They said that they misplaced it. 
They misplaced it during the summer time, whatever happened. 
They said we'll get right on it. It wasn't done. I finally 
wrote to Deputy Warden Bouseo and asked for his help. And I 
contacted Officer Valdez, our caseworker. They called the 
Board and a Ms. Cheryl, and I don't know if that's Ms. Cheryl 
Hansen or not, but a Ms. Cheryl said, oh, my gosh, and I 
heard, it was on the speaker phone, this deal isn't done yet. 
If I can find a Board member it will be done by this 
afternoon. And the next day I had my Board date for the 
13th. 
7 
1 Now, the next mess up -- I haven't done anything wrong 
2 yet. Everybody keeps saying I'm such a bad person, but I 
3 never get to perform. My dad gets involved because I had to 
4 have another angiogram. I don't know if he get involved with 
5 Mr. Baird, but I got emails in my pocket that these gentlemen 
6 brought up, that my dad sent around saying junior needs to be 
7 watched, make sure he's taking his blood, everything for the 
8 angiogram. 
9 I got sent to a halfway house which I never asked to go. 
10 The Board actually, when I went to them, they didn't know I'd 
11 went to the halfway house. They said why did you ask to go 
12 there. I didn't ask to go there. At a halfway house it's 
13 like still being in prison, but you can get your own food and 
14 stuff like that. 
15 THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, I have other matters that need 
16 to be taken care of. 
17 THE DEFENDANT: But you need to knowing everything 
18 was mixed up. 
19 THE COURT: Make your comments relevant to --
20 THE DEFENDANT: These are relevant. These are 
21 exactnesses. Now I get to the halfway house and they say I 
22 can't come to court unless I receive a fax from you in the 
23 morning time. I called every morning that morning and they 
24 faxed something down. My boss brings me up and I see you. I 
25 now have a $20,000 bail. I come back. I don't run away. 
They had seven men run away from the halfway house. 
I'm trying to resolve this. If I go to prison ri 
Mr. Waters won't get his money. I've been m prison 
now not because I've done another crime or something, 
because of this. 
His attorney, Mr. Brown, this is very important, 
are exacts, went to my agent. They called the judge 
I'm a bad person, let's send him to prison on this st 
right here. So I've served two years on something I 









sat down and got it worked out instead of him going to my 
parole agent. Now I'm here facing 11 felony twos. I gave 
you the opportunity to hang me if I didn't perform, but I've 
never performed. 
Moreover, the court attorney, I haven't even seen 
what is this called? -- tne PSI. I haven't even seen 
yet. But PSI agent at the hearing -- the attorney at 
hearing, Manny Garcia, said this isn't even acceptabl 




e to the 
misrepresented stuff that we've already aefended before the 
Board and that they threw out. So this actually isn' 
admissible m your court upon some law that they said 
t even 
• 
THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, you have another 30 seconds. 
Finish it up. 
THE DEFENDANT: So you want to resolve this and I 
9 
want to resolve this. I thought in the beginning when I met 
you you signed on this as being a good deal. Everybody keeps 
saying I'm such a bad guy. When do I get to perform? I've 
been incarcerated now for two years on something I didn't do, 
this right here. An Alford plea where I say I'm not guilty, 
but the other guy says I am, so we figure out a way to 
resolve it. If you want to resolve it -- I don't need 
anybody to determine if I'm crazy. I invented this little 
plan here. So why are you sentencing me — to take it out of 
the Board's hands and sentencing me to probation for the same 
90 days when I'm released from prison? 
THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Dunn, your 30 seconds is 
up. Anything further, Mr. Perry? 
MR. PERRY: I just wonder if the court would 
continue this for like an hour setting to hear all of the 
facts? 
THE COURT: No, counsel. This thing has gone on and 
on and talking about fairy tales. All of his life he's been 
able to dupe people into things like this. 
THE DEFENDANT: Name one thing where I've messed up. 
THE COURT: That's enough, Mr. Dunn. This court 
isn't going to be provoked any further. Counsel, if you have 
motions to file, file them. You could have filed those in 
the past and you didn't. Mr. Dunn has all of these big 
stories that he'd like everybody to believe. He's done that 
10 
all his life. This court won't be manipulated further. Mr. 
Waters isn!t going to get his money. He keeps trying to 
dangle that as a carrot. If he had any money that he wanted 
to give Mr. Waters he could have done that in the past. We 
tried that and it didn't work. 
Anything further? 
MR. PERRY: Ask the court to at least run them 
concurrent. 
THE COURT: It will be ordered that the defendant on 
the 11 counts serve not less than one nor more than 15 years 
in the Utah State Penitentiary. On each count he's to pay a 
fine in the amount of $1500. Pay restitution in the amount 
of $1,149,175, plus interest. 
The court will run counts one through three 
consecutively. Counts four through seven consecutively and 
counts eight through 11 consecutively. Very well. That will 
be the order of the court. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
11 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the videotaped hearing was 
transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court 
Reporter and Certified Court Tape Transcriber in and for 
the State of Utah. 
That a full, true and correct transcription of the 
hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the 
pages numbered 2 to 11, inclusive. 
I further certify that the original transcript was 
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Cache 
County, Logan, Utah. 
Dated this 5th day of September, 2008. 
Rodney MT~Felshaw, C.S.R., R.P.R, 
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11. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/07 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
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State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the CACHE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Charges 1 through 3 will run consecutive to charges 4 through 7, 
and charges 8 through 11 will run consecutive to those charges. 
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SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 
Charge # 2 

































Charqe # 5 

















Charge # 7 

















C h a r g e # 9 F i n e : $ 1 5 0 0 . 0 0 
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Charge # 10 Fine: $1500.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $702 .70 
Due: $1500.00 




Total Fine: $16500 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge 





Amount: $1149175.00 Plus Interest 
Dated this yj^day of V"g^> 
j^^\^!]nO^ CLINT S. JWDKINS 
Srf&i&gSi''^ District Cofkrt Judge 
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